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BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CV 2011-759 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW PY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
JUN i 3 2014 
Nature of the Case 
Woodrow Grant asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 34 (Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion). 
He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the orders summarily dismissing his petition 
for relief without appointment of counsel, decided an issue of first impression in Idaho 
by holding that, even in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, there is 
no constitutional right to counsel in post conviction. That decision is also inconsistent 
with those recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court, which suggest that 
1 
there is a right to counsel in post conviction where the post conviction process is the 
first practical opportunity for a defendant challenge the ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel. 
Additionally, this Court should grant review because the Court of Appeals' 
decision to affirm the summary dismissal of Mr. Grant's petition without appointing 
counsel under Idaho's statutory framework was inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court 
and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent. Notably, the Court of Appeals determined that 
the district court applied the wrong standard as it addressed Mr. Grant's request for an 
attorney. However, the majority decided to affirm the district court's decision denying 
counsel and summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's post conviction petition on its own 
reweighing of Mr. Grant's allegations. In so doing, the majority fell victim to the same 
error it had found in the district court's analysis - it applied the wrong standard. 
Specifically, it did not review Mr. Grant's allegations in the light most favorable to him 
(i.e., considering the allegations as if they were true), but instead, determined that they 
were disproved or not otherwise supported in the record. Judge Lansing dissented on 
that point, and, applying the proper standard, opined that Mr. Grant had alleged the 
possibility of valid claims. As a result, Judge Lansing would have vacated the district 
court's orders and remanded the case for further proceedings with the assistance of 
counsel. 
On review, this Court should vacate the district court's decisions denying counsel 
and summarily dismissing the petition and remand this case for further proceedings with 
the assistance of appointed counsel. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Grant was incarcerated on three different convictions in three cases 
(aggravated battery, possession of methamphetamine, and domestic assault). 
(R., pp.1 He timely petitioned for post-conviction relief with regard to each case. 1 
He alleged that his attorney had been deficient in multiple aspects of his representation 
at the trial level. (R., pp.2-4.) Mr. Grant set forth the facts supporting his allegations in 
his petition and attached an affidavit in support. (R., pp.2-7.) In addition, he filed a 
motion and affidavit in support of appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.9-11.) 
These documents were notarized. (R., pp.7, 11.) The record does not indicate that the 
ever an answer or motion for summary dismissal. (See 
The court subsequently issued a notice of intent to dismiss the post-
conviction . (R., pp.23-49.) In that notice, it also denied Mr. request for 
the assistance of post-conviction counsel because, it asserted, he did not allege facts 
raising the possibility of a valid claim. (R., p.27.) It then articulated its reasons for 
dismissing his various claims. (R., pp.28-49.) The most prevalent of its rationales was 
that Mr. Grant had not presented any evidence other than his own allegations, which the 
district court described as conclusory, unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.31, 37, 
38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48.) It also reasoned that Mr. Grant had not proven his 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or 
1 In regard to the aggravated battery charge, Mr. Grant had originally been placed on 
probation following a successful period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.1.) That probation 
was subsequently revoked. (R., p.1.) Therefore, in regard to that case, his petition for 
post-conviction relief is only timely from the order revoking probation. In the other two 
cases, the petition was timely from the judgments of conviction. (See R., p.1.) 
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facts to a claim for relief.2 (R., pp.37, 39, 40, 41, 48.) Along those same 
lines, the district court indicated that Mr. Grant needed to present facts which 
demonstrated the outcome of his case "would have been different but for his attorney's 
unprofessional errors," in order to survive summary dismissal. (See, e.g., R., pp.47; see 
also R., pp.95, 96, 1 06.) 
Mr. Grant filed a motion to amend the petition and a response to the district 
court's notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.50-60.) As before, his assertions were 
notarized. (R., p.60.) He alleged additional, more-specific facts that supported his 
various claims. (R., pp.52-60.) Those clarifications revealed that Mr. Grant was making 
two overarching First, he contended that trial attorney had 
and prejudicial performance. Specifically, he alleged his attorney had not 
moved for a change of venue or the district court judge's recusal, had not presented 
mitigating evidence concerning the impact of his mental condition, had not elicited 
testimony regarding the improper investigation of the underlying cases, had not 
informed him of his rights, pursuant to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006), and 
had not allowed him an opportunity to review the Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI) or assisted him to object to information improperly included therein. 
(R., pp.52-59.) 
Second, as to the two cases in which his petition was timely from the judgments 
of conviction, Mr. Grant contended his pleas were invalid. Specifically, he alleged: 
(1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently enter his guilty pleas because of his 
2 As a result of this perspective, the district court apparently did not regard the facts 
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings and affidavits as evidence that it could 
consider, or, at least, did not accept those factual allegations as true. (See generally, 
R., pp.23-49.) 
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attorney's improper assurances that he would receive concurrent sentences and the 
opportunity to participate in the rider program; and, (2) he was incompetent the time 
he entered the plea due to a severe depressive episode caused by his bi-polar disorder. 
(R., pp.56~58.) Along with his response to the notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Grant also 
renewed his request for appointment of post-conviction counsel. (R., p.59.) As part of 
that request he asserted that, in addition to the facts he had already alleged to be true, 
there was existing evidence he was unable to collect or present to the district court due 
to his incarceration, but which he claimed would provide additional support for his 
allegations. (SeeR., p.59.) 
Nevertheless, the district court summarily 
conviction relief. It asserted that Mr. Grant's 
Mr. Grant's petition for 
to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
"did not include any additional documents or affidavits." (R., p.86.) Again, as it went 
through Mr. Grant's specific allegations, the district court reasoned that he had not 
presented any evidence other than his own allegations, which it still considered to be 
conclusory, unsupported, or unsubstantiated. (R., pp.86, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 
102, 103, 104, 105, 106.) It also continued to assert that Mr. Grant had not proven his 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, or otherwise produced sufficient or 
adequate facts to state a claim for relief. (R., pp.98, 100, 1 04.) Additionally, it decided 
that Mr. Grant needed to present facts which demonstrated "the outcome of his case 
would have been different" in order to survive summary dismissal. (R., p.106; see also 
R., pp.95, 96.) It also denied Mr. Grant's renewed motion for post-conviction counsel 
for the same reason it had before. (R., p.90.) 
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Mr. Grant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing 
his petition pursuant to I.R.C. 59(e) and 60(b). (R., pp.65~85.) Again, the document 
was verified by a notary public. (R., p.85.) In that motion, Mr. Grant alleged additional 
facts which supported several of his claims. (See R., pp.69-84.) Three months later, 
the district court determined that Mr. Grant had simply 
and that he did not argue that the district court had made any errors of law or fact in its 
initial decision, and so, it denied that motion. (R., p.115.) Mr. Grant filed a notice of 
appeal which is timely as to all the district court's decisions.3 
On appeal, Mr. Grant argued that, in light of recent United Supreme Court 
Idaho should recognize a due process right counsel in post conviction. He 
argued that, under Idaho's conviction statutes, the district court's decision to 
summarily dismiss his petition appointing counsel was erroneous because it 
applied the wrong standards in reaching that decision. The Court of Appeals held that 
there was no constitutional right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings, since 
there has been no express ruling to that effect from the United States Supreme Court. 
(Opinion, pp.2-3.) Reviewing the decision to deny counsel under Idaho's post 
conviction statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the district court had, in fact, 
applied the wrong standards in reaching its decision to deny Mr. Grant counsel and 
summarily dismissing his petition for relief. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that 
3 The final judgment dismissing Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief conforming 
with the requirements from the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure was entered on June 13, 
2013, in response to the Idaho Supreme Court's order on that same date. I.A.R. 
17(e)(2) allows that a notice of appeal filed prior to the entry of an appealable order will 
become valid upon the filing of the appealable judgment. Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 
652, 653-54 (Ct. App. 2008). Therefore, Mr. Grant's September 21, 2011, notice of 
appeal is timely from the final judgment. 
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the district court improperly required Mr. Grant to present evidence proving his claims 
by a propensity the evidence, rather than viewing allegations in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Grant (i.e., considering them as if they were true). (Opinion, p.6 n.4.) 
However, the Court of Appeals split on the proper result following its determination of 
error in that regard. 
The majority decided that it could independently review Mr. Grant's allegations 
and affirm the order denying counsel and summarily dismissing the petition based the 
majority's own assessment of the validity of Mr. Grant's allegations. (See Opinion, 
pp.3-11.) To that end, it found that the record either disproved Mr. Grant's allegations 
e.g., Opinion, pp. 7, 1 0), or that allegations were insufficiently 
articulated to present potentially viable claims (see, e.g., Opinion, pp.6-11 ). Judge 
Lansing dissented, finding that the allegations made by Mr. Grant, if accepted as 
raised the possibility of valid claims. (Opinion, pp.11-14, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.) 
As such, Judge Lansing would have vacated the decision denying Mr. Grant counsel 
and remanded the case for further proceedings with the assistance of counsel. 
(Opinion, p.14, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.) 
Mr. Grant filed a timely petition for review from the Court of Appeals' Opinion. 
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1. Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the summary dismissal of 
Mr. Grant's petition for post conviction relief without the appointment of counsel 
decides an issue of substance not yet addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
a manner that is inconsistent with recent decisions from the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Whether the majority op1mon affirming the denial of Mr. Grant's motion for 
appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing his petition for relief under 
Idaho's statutory framework was inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court and 
Idaho Court of Appeals precedent 
3. Whether the district court erred by not appointing Mr. Grant counsel under 
Idaho's statutory framework. 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Grant's petition 
for post-conviction relief without properly considering the undisputed factual 




The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Grant's 
Petition For Post Conviction Relief Without The Appointment Of Counsel Decides An 
Issue Of Substance Not Yet Addressed By The Idaho Supreme Court In A Manner That 
Is Inconsistent With Recent Decisions From The United States Supreme Court 
A. Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the decision 
of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme 
I.A.R. 118(b ). This exercise of discretion is not completely . Rule 
118(b) provides some factors which must be considered in evaluating petition for 
review, including: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
I.A.R. 118(b). In regard to the argument that there is a due process right to counsel 
during initial-review collateral proceedings, Mr. Grant contends that there are special 
and important reasons for review to be granted. First, the Court of Appeals has decided 
a question of substance not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court- whether, in light 
of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, there is a due process right to 
counsel in post conviction. See I.A.R. 118(b)(1 ). Second, the Court of Appeals' 
decision in that regard is inconsistent with those recent United States Supreme Court 
9 
I.A. 118(b )(2). For those reasons, this Court should its 
authority in this case. 
8. Idaho Should Recognize A Constitutional Right To Counsel In Initial-Review 
Collateral Challenges To The Effectiveness Of Trial Counsel Under The State 
And Federal Constitutions 
As part of its promise of due process, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
right to counsel in certain situations. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 
(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant 
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless in accord with the dictates of the 
Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with Due Process Clause.") Mr. Grant 
contends one such situation arises during initial·-review collateral proceedings, such 
as when a petitioner a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time 
in post conviction in Idaho. In fact, the United States Supreme Court recently 
suggested that there is a constitutional right to that effect: 
Coleman had suggested, though without holding, that the Constitution 
may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings because "in [these] cases, ... state collateral review is the 
first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction." As 
Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a 
prisoner's "one and only appeal" as to an ineffective-assistance claim, and 
this may justify an exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right 
to counsel in collateral proceedings. 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722, 755 (1991 )). 
However, the United States Supreme Court decided not to answer that question 
in Martinez because, "[w]hile petitioner frames the question in this case as a 
constitutional one, a more narrow, but still dispositive, formulation is whether a federal 
10 
habeas court may excuse a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim when 
the claim was not properly presented in state court due to an attorney's errors in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding." /d. at 1313. The Supreme Court concluded that, as 
a matter of equity, the federal courts could not procedurally default such claims. See 
generally id. As a result, the United States Supreme Court reversed that decision 
dismissing the habeas petition and remanded the case for a determination on the 
substantive issues raised: whether Mr. Martinez's post conviction counsel had been 
ineffective and whether his underlying claim (ineffective assistance of trial counsel) was 
substantial. /d. at 1320-21. 
it reasons why may to a right to 
counsel in initial-review collateral ings which challenge the effectiveness of trial 
counsel for the first time. As the United States Supreme Court explained, there is a 
violation of the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights when he is left without the 
assistance of counsel during his "one and only appeal." /d. at 1315 (citing Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)). The Supreme Court pointed out that "[w]here ... the 
initial-review collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways 
the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim." /d. 
As such, "[w]ithout the help of an adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar 
difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim." /d. 
For example, the Supreme Court explained that during such a "first-tier" 
proceeding, pro se petitioners '"are generally ill equipped to represent themselves 
because they do not have a brief from counsel or an opinion of the court addressing 
11 
their claim of error."' /d. 1317 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U 605, 617 
(2005)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized "[c]laims of ineffective 
assistance at trial often require investigative work and an understanding of trial 
strategy," implying that applicants for post-conviction relief often could not engage in 
that necessary investigation, but appointed counsel could.4 !d. As such, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded: 
When the issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] cannot be raised on 
direct review, . . . a prisoner asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding cannot rely on a 
court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that claim. To 
present a claim ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the 
's procedures, a prisoner likely needs an attorney. 
/d. (citing J-lalbert, U.S. at 619) (emphasis added). on all this it 
as though, given the chance, the United Supreme Court will hold that 
the applicant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel during the initial-
review collateral proceeding, particularly if that collateral proceeding is separate from 
the direct appeal. See id. at 1315-17. In fact, in his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out 
that the practical effect of the Martinez ruling and actually establishing a constitutional 
4 Mr. Grant specifically alleged that this was so in his case: "Because of [Mr.] Grant's 
status as an incarcerated individual, it is almost impossible for him to present evidence 
[as the district court is requiring]." (R., p.59.) Specifically, Mr. Grant asserted that he 
"1. [Is f]airly ignorant of the law and evidentiary requirements[;] II. Cannot go and collect 
paperwork and testimony in person[;] Ill. Is unsure of what evidence this Court would 
consider important and pertinent[;] IV. And is unable to properly write up a response that 
is adequate and up to the high standards this Court is accustomed to." (R., p.59.) As 
such, according to the United States Supreme Court, he "likely needs an effective 
attorney." Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (emphasis added). 
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is, for all intents 
and uu'''"'"' the same.5 Martinez, 132 Ct. at 1321 , 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
It is true that Martinez was addressing a state system where there was a 
categorical bar to raising challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel during the 
direct appeal process, and it is also true that Idaho not employ such a system. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the rule from Martinez 
applies to states with systems like Idaho's: "a distinction between (1) a State that denies 
permission to raise the claim on direct appeal and (2) a State that in theory grants 
permission but, as a matter procedural design and systematic operation, denies a 
meaningful opportunity to do so is a distinction without difference." Trevino v. Thaler, 
133 Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013). Since, "as a matter of its structure, design, and 
operation," Idaho's judicial system "does not offer most defendants a meaningful 
opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal," 
the rule and analysis from Martinez applies against Idaho's post conviction system.6 
5 State courts have also recognized that Martinez, in effect, has recognized a right to 
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings. For example, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court pointed out: "In short, this new equitable rule in practice can be just as 
coercive as the recognition of a new right. ... " Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 
583-84 (Pa. 2013). Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court noted: "Although 
choosing not to decide the issue, the United States Supreme Court explained the 
rationale for finding a constitutional right to counsel in 'initial-review collateral 
proceedings."' State v. Quixal, 70 A.3d 749, 754-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
6 In fact, the federal courts for the District of Idaho have consistently been applying the 
rule from Martinez in cases arising out of Idaho convictions. See, e.g., See, e.g., 
Eby v. Blades, 2014 WL 1379656, p.9 (D. Idaho Apr. 8, 2014) (unpublished) (Magistrate 
Judge Williams presiding); Veenstra v. Smith, 2014 WL 1270626, p.11 (D. Idaho 
Mar. 26, 2014) (unpublished) (Chief Judge Winmill presiding); Gable v. Wengler, 2013 
WL 4097711, p.8 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2013) (unpublished) (Magistrate Judge Bush 
presiding); Tellez-Vasquez v. Smith, 2013 WL 4039462, p.3 (D. Idaho Aug. 7, 2013) 
(unpublished) (Magistrate Judge Dale presiding), vacated; Horozny v. Smith, 2013 WL 
3776372, p.2 (D. Idaho Jul. 16, 2013) (unpublished) (District Judge Lodge presiding). 
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e.g., Matthews v. State, 1 Idaho 801, 806 (1992) ("[A] petition post~conviction 
ief is the preferred forum for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."); 
see a/so State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008) (noting that, if a defendant 
pursues a claim of ineffective assistance in the direct appeal, he cannot then bring the 
same claim in post-conviction); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(reaffirming that "it is usually inappropriate to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction," explaining that, "claims of 
ineffective assistance regularly raise issues on which no evidence was presented at the 
defendant's trial. . . the trial record on direct appeal is rarely adequate for review of 
claims."). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court pointed out that recognition of such a right would 
only constitute an exception to the general rule that there is no constitutional right to 
counsel. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755 (identifying the general rule arising from the 
decisions in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), and Finley v. Pennsylvania, 481 
U.S. 551 (1987)). To that point, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently relied on Finley 
to conclude that "there is no Sixth Amendment Right to counsel in a collateral attack 
upon a conviction."7 Murphy v. State,_ Idaho_, 2014 WL 712695, pp.5-6 (Feb. 
25, 2014), not yet final; see also Fol/inus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902-03 (Ct. App. 
7 This Court has repeatedly recognized the general rule from Finley- that there is no 
constitutional right to counsel in post conviction. Mr. Grant is not asking the Court to 
overrule that interpretation of Finley. Rather, he is asking that this Court recognize an 
exception to Finley based on the language in Martinez. To the extent that this Court 
determines recognizing an exception to Finley because there is a constitutional right to 
counsel in the initial-review collateral proceedings based on the language in Martinez 
requires overruling its own precedent, it should do so, since the language in Martinez 
demonstrates why such precedent would be manifestly wrong, unjust, or unwise. See 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592-93 (2006) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990)). 
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1995). However, the decision in Murphy not appear to have taken into 
generally Murphy, 2014 WL 712695. Therefore, the issue whether 
there is an exception to the general rule in Finley is an issue of first impression in Idaho. 
In fact, given the discussion in Martinez about the reasons that a petitioner 
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in initial-review 
collateral proceedings needs the assistance of counsel, the conclusion that there is no 
right to counsel in such cases is erroneous, at least insofar as the due process clause 
would allow a right to counsel in such situations. Basically, the decision in Martinez 
suggests that, while a post conviction system such as the one Idaho employs is 
and based on sound reasoning, employing such a system 
consequences for the implementing it. Martinez, 1 S. Ct. at 1318 ("By 
deliberately choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal 
process, where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly diminishes 
prisoners' ability to file [or effectively pursue] such claims.") Of important note here is 
the Supreme Court's implication that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
would traditionally be presented at a time when the defendant has a constitutional right 
to counsel. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. The logical conclusion is that the 
constitutional protection of the right to counsel cannot be avoided by the procedural 
expedient of requiring the claim to be brought by a different process. Compare 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (not allowing the State to circumvent a 
constitutional protection (double jeopardy) by a mere procedural mechanism (charging 
two crimes instead of one based on meaningless distinctions)). 
15 
Idaho should answer the Supreme Court's open question and decide whether 
is due right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings. After all, 
the federal district court in the District of Idaho have already recognized that Idaho's 
post-conviction procedures fall within the scope of the Martinez holding based on the 
decision in Trevino, and so, have begun deciding the merits of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in the place of Idaho's courts. (See footnote 5, supra, page 13.) 
Therefore, for the reasons discussed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Martinez and Trevino, this Court should recognize the due process right to counsel 
during initial-review collateral proceedings. As a result, it should reverse the district 
court's Mr. Grant the assistance of counsel on his petition for post-
conviction and remand this case for further proceedings with instructions that the 
district court appoint counsel to assist Mr. Grant. 
II. 
The Majority Opinion Affirming The Denial Of Mr. Grant's Motion For Appointment 
Of Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Relief Under Idaho's 
Statutory Framework Was Inconsistent With Idaho Supreme Court And Idaho 
Court Of Appeals Precedent 
Should this Court decide that there is no constitutional right to post-conviction 
counsel in Idaho, it should still grant review because the Court of Appeals' Opinion 
affirming the denial of counsel under Idaho's post conviction statute is inconsistent with 
Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals precedent. See I.A.R. 118(2)-(3). 
The Court of Appeals found that the district court had applied the wrong standard 
in its decisions to deny counsel and summarily dismiss the petition: 
The district court, throughout its notice of intent to dismiss, which the 
district court cited as the basis for denial of the appointment of counsel, 
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repeatedly found Grant failed to present any admissible evidence and 
presented only bare, conc!usory allegations. We note that verified 
pleadings, with respect to facts within a petitioner's personal knowledge, 
are admissible evidence. These types of allegations by a petitioner differ 
from allegations that address facts outside the personal knowledge of a 
petitioner or those based on pure speculation. Furthermore, when 
requesting appointed counsel, a petitioner does not need to support his or 
her claims with admissible evidence. Indeed, one of the important 
functions of counsel may be to assist in finding and presenting admissible 
evidence. The petitioner need only allege facts which raise the possibility 
of a valid claim. The district court's order demonstrates it failed to make 
this distinction when addressing Grant's claims. 
(Opinion, p.6 n.4 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).) 
As Judge Lansing pointed out, the proper response to the district court's error 
was to remand case for the district court for appointment of and 
consideration of under the proper standards. (Opinion, pp.11-1 J., 
dissenting in part.) However, the majority rejected that remedy, instead, affirming the 
order summarily dismissing the petition without appointment of counsel based on its 
own review of the allegations in light of the record. That decision is problematic on 
several levels. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "it is essential that 
the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects [in his allegations] so he 
has an opportunity to respond .... " Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001 ), 
superceded by statute as stated in Charboneau v. State (hereinafter, Charboneau 1), 
140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004) (noting that the statute requires the opportunity to respond 
as well). Since Mr. Grant does not have an opportunity to respond to the majority's 
reassessment of his allegations, the majority's opinion runs afoul of this requirement. 
However, the most evident problem with the majority's decision is that, in reweighing the 
claims, the majority fell victim to the same error the district court did - it applied the 
wrong standard. 
17 
In properly reviewing a request for appointment of post conviction counsel, "a 
must review the facts in a light favorable to the petitioner, and determine 
whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true." State v. 
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). As this Court reaffirmed, "the task of this 
Court 'is to determine whether the appellant has alleged facts in his petition that if true, 
would entitle him to relief."'8 e.g., State v. Baldwin, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007) 
(quoting Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (hereinafter, Charboneau /) 
(emphasis added).9 
The error in the majority's review in this case clearly evidenced by its decision 
that "Grant's claim of assistance is disproved by his guilty plea advisory 
forrns."10 (Opinion, p.7 (discussing Mr. Grant's allegation that his attorney failed 
8 The requirement that the reviewing court consider Mr. Grant's allegations as true is 
particularly applicable in this case since the State did not file an answer, and so 
Mr. Grant's allegations are unrebutted. (See generally R.; see also RoAs.) "A court is 
required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true .... " State v. Baldwin, 
145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007) (emphasis added). 
9 Mr. Grant recognizes that the Court was reviewing a decision to summarily dismiss a 
petition for relief in Saykhamchone and Baldwin, and not the decision to deny a motion 
for post conviction counsel. However, the standards regarding construing evidence in 
the petitioner's favor applies to reviews of denials of request for counsel because, as 
this Court indicated in Charboneau/, the standard for demonstrating the possibility of a 
valid claim (meriting appointment of counsel) is less stringent than demonstrating a 
genuine issue of material fact (meriting an evidentiary hearing). See Charboneau I, 140 
Idaho at 792-93 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). Presumably, for this reason, this 
Court quoted the standard regarding construing evidence from Saykhamchone in the 
section of the Charboneau I opinion which addressed the denial of the petitioner's 
motion for counsel. /d. at 793 (quoting Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321 ). 
10 While the "disproved by the record" standard may be applicable during summary 
dismissal proceedings, see, e.g., McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2009), it is only 
really applicable when the court is assessing allegations regarding a fact which cannot 
be disputed, not when assessing two statements for their veracity. 
For example, where a petitioner alleged that he did not enter a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea when he pled guilty to murder because he did not know 
that the victim had not died, but, in fact, he had only pled guilty to aggravated battery, 
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advise him as required by Estrada) (emphasis added); see a/so Opinion, p.1 0 (making a 
similar determination regarding Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney made inappropriate 
promises about his guilty plea).) The fact that the Court of Appeals concluded that 
Mr. Grant's claim was disproved ipso facto means that it did not evaluate the allegation 
as if it were true or in the light most favorable to him. In fact, as the majority itself had 
just noted: "The petitioner need only allege facts which raise the possibility of a valid 
claim." (Opinion, p.6 n.4 (emphasis in original).) Mr. Grant did exactly that - he 
alleged that his attorney had not advised him of his rights under Estrada, and he alleged 
that his attorney made impermissible promises about his guilty plea and the sentence 
could expect to receive. If Mr. Grant is if those allegations are true 
regardless of other evidence may contradict (i.e., that the allegations are 
considered as if they are true and the other evidence considered to be erroneous), 
Mr. Grant would be entitled to relief on each point. Therefore, Mr. Grant alleged the 
then the petitioner's allegation would be clearly disproved by the record, such as the 
documents from the change of plea hearing and the judgment of conviction. The fact 
that he pled guilty to aggravated battery cannot be disproved by any assertion to the 
contrary that the petitioner subsequently makes. 
However, the "disproved by the record" standard is not applicable when the court 
is evaluating the veracity of two inconsistent statements. The fact that the two 
statements are inconsistent does not inherently demonstrate that one is true and the 
other is not. That determination is necessarily dependent on an examination of the 
declarant's explanations for the inconsistency between the two statements (which, in 
post conviction, occurs at an evidentiary hearing). In that case, the presence of the two 
contradictory statements simply creates a genuine issue of material fact as to which of 
the two statements is true. 
As a result, the "disproved by the record" standard does not apply to demonstrate 
that the statements Mr. Grant made in support of his petition are definitively false for the 
sole reason that he made contradictory statements at the guilty plea hearing. Such a 
holding would be equivalent to disregarding a witness's recantation of her testimony 
simply because she offered the contradictory (and now-recanted) testimony at trial. 
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possibility of valid claims, and, as such, was entitled to the of counsel. 
Opinion, pp.13-14, Lansing, J., in part.) 
The same is true regarding Mr. Grant's allegations that defense counsel was 
ineffective for not presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing. (See Opinion, pp.8-9 
(affirming the denial of counsel and summary dismissal of that allegation because the 
presentation of evidence is left to counsel's strategic discretion). There are two flaws in 
that reasoning: first, it presumes that the decision to not present that evidence was 
actually strategic, and not an oversight by defense counsel. Second, even if the 
decision were strategic, that decision could still constitute ineffective of 
counsel if it were the product of ignorance the law, insufficient preparation, or 
such factors. As Judge Lansing reminded the majority, review of the decision 
counsel does not require the petitioner to prove his claims, since part of the point of 
having counsel is developing the claims. (Opinion, p.13, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.) 
Therefore, Judge Lansing correctly pointed out that the majority's reliance on the "sound 
trial strategy" rationale for summarily dismissing the claim was prematurely applied, 
since, with assistance of counsel, Mr. Grant could have identified and provided 
additional evidence showing that counsel's decisions were not sound trial strategy. 
(Opinion, p.13, Lansing, J., dissenting in part.) Therefore, Mr. Grant alleged the 
possibility of a valid claim in that regard as well. 
Because the majority, like the district court before it, failed to apply the proper 





Idaho law permits appointment of post-conviction counsel if the petitioner 
demonstrates the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. I.C. § 19-4904; 
Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 792-93. Since the facts Mr. Grant alleged demonstrated 
the possibility of valid post conviction claims, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order denying appointment of post-conviction counsel, as well as the order 
summarily dismissing the petition, remand this case for further with the 
of counsel. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The elements of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are two-fold: 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable (i.e., deficient); and there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for those errors 
{i.e., prejudicial). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984 ); Estrada, 143 
Idaho at 561. An applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to appointment of counsel 
if he "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 
651, 654 (2007); see also Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. Allegations of fact 
contained in the verified pleadings are properly considered as evidence in support of the 
petition. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Loveland v. State, 
141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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For of his claims, Mr. Grant alleged in his verified petition which show 
possibility of a valid claim, in that his assertions of fact support at least one, 
if not both of the elements under Strickland. (See R., pp.1~8, 50-64.) Therefore, he 
should have had counsel appointed during the post-conviction proceedings. 
C. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Advise Him Of 
His Right To Remain Silent During The Psychological Evaluation Per The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that counsel's performance is objectively 
deficient if counsel fails to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent during a 
psychological evaluation. 143 Idaho 564; Murray v. 156 
Idaho 159, 167 (2014) (reaffirming that counsel is deficient if he fails to advise his client 
regarding the client's rights under Estrada). This right to silence is well-established in 
precedent and applies in regard to all psychological evaluations occurring before 
sentencing. Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 46 (2009); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 
871 (1989). This is because, unlike a routine presentence investigation, which relies 
heavily on information already available through public records, a psychological 
evaluation delves into more personal areas of the defendant's life, and thereby, 
presents a greater risk of self-incrimination. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. Therefore, if 
counsel failed to inform Mr. Grant of his right to remain silent during the psychological 
evaluations conducted prior to his sentencing, that performance was deficient. /d. at 
564. 
Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings that his attorney did not advise him 
about his Estrada rights in regard to the psychological evaluation conducted as part of 
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the presentence investigation. (R., pp.3, 6, 54.) Mr. Grant also alleged that information 
obtained during this interview was against him his sentencing hearing. 
(R., p.54.) Since the facts articulated in the verified pleadings were within Mr. Grant's 
personal knowledge, they constitute evidence that the district court could consider. 
Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, Mr. Grant alleged facts which demonstrate a possibly 
valid claim that his attorney's performance was deficient and prejudiced him. 
Therefore, because he alleged facts which show the possibility of a valid claim in this 
regard, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was 
in error. 
The district denied Mr. Grant's for an attorney on this 
on its review of a guilty plea questionnaire filled out by Mr. Grant. (R., p.98 (citing 
"Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form, Idaho Criminal Rules Appendix A, April 22, 2010, 
2"). 11 Mr. Grant's answers in those questionnaires do not, however, justify the district 
court's decision to deny Mr. Grant post-conviction counsel. All Mr. Grant had to do was 
present facts which showed the possibility of a valid claim. 
To that end, those allegations are to be considered in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Grant (i.e., as if they were true, regardless of what other information may be in the 
record). See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 792. While the 
11 By referring to that questionnaire, the district court impliedly took judicial notice of that 
document. However, Mr. Grant filled out separate questionnaires in CR-2009-19445-FE 
and CR-19451, both of which bear the date "April 22, 201 0." As the Court of Appeals 
noted, these questionnaires were not included in the appellate record. (Opinion, p.7 
n.5.) In his appellant's brief, Mr. Grant indicated that he was intending to file a motion 
asking this Court for an order taking judicial notice of those documents. (App. Br., p.16 
n.16.) However, due to an oversight, appellate counsel failed to file that motion. 
Appellate counsel apologizes for that error and has filed that motion contemporaneously 
with this brief. 
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questionnaire remind the defendant that he still retains some right to remain silent 
Augmentation Guilty Questionnaire, p.2), that reminder does not disprove 
the allegation or mean that the claim is meritless. The Kentucky Supreme Court has 
articulated this concept best: 
[W]hile the representation of a defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor 
at a Boykin hearing,C 2J as well as any findings by the judge accepting the 
plea, "constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 
proceedings," if there is proof that the 
representations "were so much the product of such factors as 
misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others as to make the 
guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment. 
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 457 (Ky. 2001) (quoting 
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-75 (1977)) (emphasis added); cf. Murray, 156 
Idaho at 167. In Murray, this Court determined that, while the petitioner had shown 
deficient performance by his attorney, he had failed to show prejudice in light of his 
answers on the guilty plea questionnaire. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167-68. That decision 
does not mean, however, that a petitioner could not ever show prejudice in light of such 
statements. See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 457. As such, Mr. Grant's allegation that his 
attorney had not adequately advised him regarding his rights under Estrada, which this 
Court has held does constitute deficient performance, raises the possibility of a valid 
claim. 
Therefore, and for all the reasons articulated in the Appellant's Brief, which are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto (App. Br., pp.15-21 ), Mr. Grant's verified 
allegations make out the possibility of a valid claim under Estrada. Thus, the decision to 
deny Mr. Grant the assistance of counsel was erroneous. 
12 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 246-47 (1969). 
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D. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Present A Possible Valid Claim That His Attorney 
Provided Ineffective Assistance By Not Reviewing The PSI With Mr. Grant Or 
Assisting Him To Object To Erroneous Or Unreliable Information Contained In 
The PSI 
The information included in PSis must be reliable; otherwise, it is inappropriate 
for the district court to consider it at sentencing. I.C.R. 32(e)(1). Information included in 
a I may be presumed reliable if the defendant is afforded an opportunity to challenge, 
explain, or rebut that information. State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 263 ( 1998 ). 
Mr. Grant alleged in his response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss his 
claim that he had been deprived of that opportunity because his attorney had failed to 
PSI with him or to assist him in challenging erroneously-included or 
unreliable information contained therein. (R., p.56.) Such a failure is 
objectively unreasonable performance by an attorney, particularly because erroneously-
included or unreliable information in a PSI can haunt a defendant in numerous future 
proceedings. See Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1. As a result, those allegations also 
demonstrate the prejudice of counsel's ineffective performance. See id. 
Therefore, since the verified and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant alleged presented a 
possible valid claim for post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed 
and the decision to deny him counsel was in error. 
E. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Valid Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel That His Attorney Provided Ineffective 
Assistance By Not Presenting Certain Mitigating Evidence 
In regard to Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by 
not presenting certain mitigating evidence at sentencing, the district court noted in its 
notice of intent to dismiss that Mr. Grant had not identified what mitigating evidence his 
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attorney had purportedly failed to present, and so he had not sufficiently supported his 
claim. (R., pp.38-39.) 
However, in his response to that notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Grant did identify 
the evidence to which he was referring. (R., pp.52-53, 56-59.) Specifically, he alleged 
that there were two witnesses, one of whom would have contradicted the victim's 
version of events and who would have testified as to the overall inadequacies of the 
investigation, and another who would have testified that the police had '"lost' testimony" 
or other evidence that should have been presented to the district court. (R., pp.58-59.) 
In addition, he explained that were several mental health examination reports 
which would demonstrate should have considered for health court, 
or that would otherwise provided the district court with a more complete 
perspective of his mental health issues.13 (R., pp.52-53, 56-57.) The failure to present 
mitigating evidence constitutes deficient performance by trial counsel. Knutsen v. State, 
144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 2007) (determining that the petitioner "raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to 
investigate and present [mitigating] evidence") (emphasis added). Additionally, strongly 
implied in Mr. Grant's assertions is the idea that, had the district court been presented 
with this evidence, there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Grant would have received 
13 In a clear demonstration of the Catch-22 to which the district court subjected 
Mr. Grant in regard to sufficiently articulating his claims, the district court found that 
Mr. Grant had presented no evidence to support his own allegations as to whether he 
might have been accepted into the mental health court program (R., p.96), but would 
not give him counsel to help investigate the viability of that claim by obtaining the 
necessary evidence (which Mr. Grant alleged existed, but was unattainable by him due 
to his incarceration). (See, e.g., R., p.53.) In essence, in order to get counsel 
appointed, the district court required Mr. Grant to provide evidence that it was not 
possible for him to get without the assistance of counsel. 
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a more lenient sentence. 
and unrefuted facts Mr. Grant demonstrate possibility a valid claim for 
post-conviction relief, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him 
counsel was in error. 
Furthermore, the idea that Mr. Grant's answers on the guilty plea questionnaire 
conclusively disprove these allegations (see R., p.1 02), is illogical, since the actions 
which are alleged to be deficient occurred after Mr. Grant had filled out the 
questionnaires. (See R., pp.58-59.) Mr. Grant could not have known or complained of 
the deficient performance at the sentencing hearing at time he filled the guilty 
questionnaire the change of hearing. district cou use of the 
guilty plea questionnaire in evaluating this claim (see R., p.99) was erroneous. At any 
rate, the claim is still potentially valid despite any information in the answers to the guilty 
plea questionnaire to the contrary. See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 457. Since Mr. Grant 
alleged facts demonstrating the possibility of a valid claim in this regard, the district 
court erred by not appointing him an attorney. 
F. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Move For A 
Change Of Venue Or Disqualification Of The Presiding Judge 
Mr. Grant asserted that his attorney should have moved for a change of venue or 
to disqualify the presiding judge because of specific prejudicial circumstances. For 
example, Mr. Grant alleged that the victim's mother may have been able to influence the 
investigation based on her position within the police department and that the presiding 
judge may have had a bias against Mr. Grant based upon the judge's past 
representation of Mr. Grant's brother. (See R., p.52) The district court dismissed that 
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to the district court, there was no evidence in the record which would 
the basis for such a claim. (R., pp.35-36.) 
In regard to its decision that the claim was not viable in post conviction, the 
district court cited State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 923 (1982) (hereinafter, Carter 1). 
However, the decision in Carter I was abrogated when a new trial was granted pursuant 
to a successful post-conviction action. See Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788 (1985) 
Carter//). In Carter II, the Supreme Court explained decision in Carter I 
regarding the propriety of the challenge to counsel's failure to move to change venue: 
[T]he alleged deficiencies fell into the area of strategic and tactical choices 
that the record was "devoid of any indication that such choices were a 
result of inadequate preparation or ignorance of counsel. Absent such 
evidence" we held "it must be presumed that defense counsel's actions 
were not [ineffective]." However, and of crucial importance to the present 
proceeding, we went on to state that, "If evidence to the contrary is 
available outside the record, it may be presented only by way of a petition 
for post-conviction relief .... " This is precisely what appellant has done in 
the present case. Thus, it would be anomalous for us to hold, after 
directing appellant that the proper way to pursue his claim was through a 
petition for post-conviction relief, that post conviction relief is now 
barred .... 
/d. at 792 (quoting Carter I, 103 Idaho at 923). Therefore, while the decision of whether 
or not to request a change of venue is a tactical decision that will usually not be 
reviewed in post-conviction, see, e.g., State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175 (Ct. App. 1993), 
Carter II provides that challenges to such decisions may appropriately be raised in post 
conviction, if backed by sufficient evidence. Carter II, 108 Idaho at 792. 
In regard to its determination that there was no evidence supporting Mr. Grant's 
allegations of bias, the district court cited to Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333 (Ct. App. 
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1998). (R, p.36.) However, in Small, the applicant had failed to point to any 
"which might reveal the district court's bias." Small, 1 Idaho at Thus, 
there was no evidence which would demonstrate that the attorney had objectively 
unreasonable by not requesting the judge's recusal. See id. In this case, however, 
Mr. Grant has pointed to specific evidence which might reveal bias on the part of the 
district court, and so, Mr. Grant articulated the possibility of a valid claim, and thus, 
should have at least had the aid of an attorney to fully investigate and pursue that 
argument in post-conviction. See Marlinez, 132 U.S. at 1317; Swader, 143 Idaho at 
654; Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793. 
As , Mr. Grant alleged facts which, if true, demonstrate that decision to 
not request a change of venue was objectively unreasonable. (See R., p.52.) Those 
allegations also imply the argument that the decision to not challenge venue caused 
prejudice to Mr. Grant through the loss of due process and a neutral magistrate. 
Therefore, Mr. Grant alleged facts which demonstrate the possibility of a valid claim. 
Compare Carler II, 108 Idaho at 792. As a result, counsel should have been appointed, 
and the decision to deny that request was in error. 
G. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
That His Attorney Provided Ineffective Assistance By Inducing His Guilty Plea 
With The Assurance That Jurisdiction Would Be Retained While He Participated 
In The Rider Program 
If an attorney provides his client with advice which goes beyond the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys during the plea process, that advice may deprive 
the plea of the requisite voluntariness. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884 (Ct. App. 
2008). To prove prejudice, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable probability 
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that, absent the deficient advice, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial. /d. 
Initially, Mr. failed to articulate the "false which would demonstrate 
the deficient advice he claimed occurred. (R., pp.7, 44~45.) 
However, in his response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, he 
clarified his claim, alleging in his verified amended pleadings that his attorney told him 
the district court had agreed in a meeting in chambers to impose concurrent sentences 
that would not exceed a unified term of ten years with four years fixed, and also that trial 
counsel told him he could expect a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.57.) Mr. Grant 
also stated in his verified amended pleadings that, but for those assurances, there was 
strong likelihood" he would insisted on proceeding to trial. (R., . ) If 
those present the possibility of a valid claim. See Nevarez, 1 Idaho 
at 884. Therefore, counsel should have been appointed and the decision to deny him 
counsel was in error. 
H. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts Which Demonstrate A Possible Viable Claim That He 
Was Incompetent To Enter A Knowing, Voluntary, And Intelligent Guilty Plea 
In post-conviction actions where the petitioner is claiming a guilty plea is invalid 
because he was not competent when it was entered, the petitioner must "present 
admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was 
incompetent at the time he entered his plea" in order to succeed on a claim of 
incompetence. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 678 (2009). To demonstrate 
incompetence, an applicant must show that he lacked "the capacity to [(1 )] understand 
the proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense."' /d. (quoting 
State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 842 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960))). 
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Mr. Grant alleged that was incompetent due to his mental health issues. 'pp.5, 
He also the district court that various medical records would support 
his allegations but, due to his incarceration, he was unable to provide them to the 
district court. 14 (R., p.57.) These alleged demonstrate the possibility of a valid 
claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As such, counsel should 
have been appointed and the decision to deny him counsel was in error. 
As with Mr. Grant's allegations in terms of his Estrada rights (see Section 111(8), 
supra), the district court attempted to justify its actions based on the form guilty plea 
questionnaire. (R., p.1 02.) However, as explained supra, that information does 
not that failed to allege showing the possibility of a valid 
claim. Fraser, S.W.3d at 457. Since Mr. Grant alleged facts which gave rise to 
the possibility of valid claims, he should have been appointed counsel. 
Ultimately, since the facts Mr. Grant alleged in his verified pleadings show the 
possibility of multiple viable post-conviction claims, the district court's decision to deny 
Mr. Grant the assistance of post-conviction counsel was erroneous. As such, this Court 
should vacate the district court's order denying the appointment of counsel, as well as 
the order summarily dismissing the petition, and remand this case for further 
proceedings with the assistance of counsel. 
14 As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, such offers of proof could be considered to 
corroborate the applicant's statements if they spoke to the applicant's incompetency 
during the relevant period of time (the change of plea hearing). Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 
678. It is also one of the reasons that the United States Supreme Court has identified 
as revealing why such petitioners "likely need" the assistance of post-conviction 
counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317; Charboneau /, 140 Idaho at 792-93. 
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IV. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief Without Properly Considering The Undisputed Factual Allegations He 
Made In His Verified Petition And Affidavit In Support Of That Petition 
A. Introduction 
In addition to its failure to provide post-conviction counsel when it was merited, 
the district court also applied the wrong standards when it summarily dismissed 
Mr. Grant's petition for post-conviction relief. In a continuing theme, the district court did 
not recognize that the facts set forth in Mr. Grant's verified statements and pleadings, as 
well as the attached affidavits in support of his petition, constituted evidence that the 
district court to consider when determining Mr. Grant had pled a 
genuine issues of material fact. It also failed to that when these statements of 
fact went unrefuted by the State (which never filed an answer in this case), it was 
required to accept those statements of fact as true for purposes of summary disposition. 
Additionally, those facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom had to be construed in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party {i.e., Mr. Grant). A proper application 
of these standards also shows that Mr. Grant presented several genuine issues of 
material fact which, if true, would entitle him to relief. As such, summary dismissal was 
improper and this case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. The District Court Failed To Apply The Proper Standards Or Recognize What 
Evidence It Could Consider, And So Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Grant's 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
The district court committed reversible error by failing to recognize the evidence 
available for its consideration (the facts Mr. Grant himself alleged to be true) or giving 
that evidence its proper weight (presumed true, as they were undisputed). See Mata, 
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124 Idaho at 593; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Therefore, its repeated assertions that 
there was no admissible evidence supporting Mr. 
affecting the whole decision. (See, e.g., R., pp.31, 37, 
claims demonstrates error, 
) As such, its determinations 
on all the specific issues are tainted beyond reconciliation and this Court should remand 
this case for a proper determination under the proper standards. See, e.g., 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) (hereinafter, Charboneau II). 
In terms of summary dismissal in post-conviction actions, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has clarified that only "[w]hen the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle 
the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without an evidentiary 
hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho 903. Therefore, if alleged facts, if assumed 
to be true, would support the claim, summary dismissal is inappropriate. /d. Among the 
that the district court may consider, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, are 
verified facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant set forth in "affidavits, 
records or other evidence." /d.; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. According to the Court of 
Appeals, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal 
knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the 
same probative force as an affidavit." Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. As such, the allegations 
in the verified filings alone can provide evidence "sufficient to raise a factual issue 
requiring an evidentiary hearing." Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. Thus, the verified 
pleadings alone can provide the prima facie showing to overcome summary dismissal. 
/d. 
Nevertheless, the district court failed to apply those rules and determined that 
most of Mr. Grant's allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence, instead 
33 
determining that his allegations were bare, of the fact that they were forth 
in verified pleadings and affidavits. (See, 'pp.37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 
90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106.) The fact that the allegations were 
bare does not mean that the district court was free to ignore them - the question it had 
to consider was whether those allegations, bare though they may have been, if 
presumed to be true, 15 would entitle Mr. Grant to relief. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 
903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. Mr. Grant's allegations met that standard, and so he 
should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing. 
For example, in regard to Mr. Grant's claim regarding his Estrada rights, the 
district court stated: "However, Grant presented no admissible evidence to 
demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding his rights to his 
participation in the psychological examination. Instead the Petitioner has only set forth 
unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which provide no relief under the Uniform Post 
Conviction Procedure Act." (R., p.98 (emphasis added).) This reasoning is clearly 
erroneous because Mr. Grant alleged in his pleadings that his attorney did not advise 
him about his Estrada rights. 16 (R., pp.3, 6.) Those petitions and affidavits were 
verified. (R., pp.?, 60.) As such, those allegations constituted admissible, verified 
15 To presume a claim to be true means that the claim is considered to be accurate, 
even if other evidence might suggest otherwise. Where, as here, the district court 
summarily dismisses a claim based on potentially contradictory evidence, it has 
erroneously applied the presumption of accuracy to the other evidence, not to the claim 
being evaluated. Practically speaking, all the potentially contradictory evidence does in 
the face of an appropriately-applied presumption is create a genuine issue of material 
fact. If a genuine issue of material fact exists, an evidentiary hearing is a necessity. 
See, e.g., Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 157. Therefore, when the presumption is accurately 
applied, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's petition. 
1 A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003). 
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evidence supporting his claim for relief. Mata, 1 Idaho at 593. rtherrnore, the 
court's decision to summarily dismiss '"'"'J{"'u "Mr. Grant no 
admissible evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him properly regarding 
his rights prior to his participation in the psychological examination," and because "the 
Petitioner has set forth unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which can provide no 
relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Act" (R., p.98), is directly contrary to 
established precedent, which provides that the verified petitions alone may be the basis 
for relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. 17 Charboneau II, 144 Idaho 
at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Mata, 124 Idaho 593. The only evidence, 
in a verified petition, was that Mr. Grant's attorney failed to Grant 
of his Estrada rights. Estrada it clear that, if true, that claim entitle 
Mr. Grant to relief. See also Murray, 1 Idaho at 167. Therefore, presuming the claim 
to be true (particularly as it was unrebutted by the State), the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing the petition. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903; Baldwin, 145 Idaho 
at 153. 
As another example, the district court stated that "Mr. Grant also submitted the 
Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which did not include any 
additional documents or affidavits." (R., p.86.) This is another clearly erroneous 
determination, since the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
17 The undue limitation of information that may be properly considered (i.e., the district 
court's refusal to consider the facts set forth in Mr. Grant's verified filings because they 
were just his assertions) constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
Cf. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (2008). As the district court has unduly 
limited its consideration of the evidence before it, it has abused its discretion in this 
manner, further justifying remanding this case for further proceedings. See id. 
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was notarized. (R., p.60.) As such, it was essentially an affidavit. Mata, 1 Idaho at 
Critically, this assertion by the district court came before it began discussing any 
of Mr. Grant's individual claims, which indicates that the erroneous rationale was 
applied to all the ensuing subsections. As a result of numerous misapplications of the 
Mata standard, both generally and to specific claims, the district court's errors 
significantly undermined the entire decision. 
Even when the district court did accept the evidence Mr. Grant presented, it did 
not give it the appropriate weight. If the allegations are unrefuted, they must be 
accepted for purposes of summary disposition. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 1 The 
did not file an answer in this case. (See generally R.) As such, Mr. Grant's 
allegations were never refuted. Therefore, at least for purposes of summary disposition, 
Mr. Grant's factual allegations had to be accepted as true. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
Furthermore, in summary disposition proceedings, the facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. However, the district court reviewed the 
evidence in the light least favorable to Mr. Grant, determining that the evidence was 
insufficient or that Mr. Grant had failed to prove the allegations. (See, e.g., R., pp.39, 
40, 41, 48, 98, 100, 104) At the summary judgment phase, a petitioner is not required 
to prove his claim; rather, the petitioner is required to show that claim exists which, if he 
can prove it at a subsequent evidentiary hearing, 18 would entitle him to relief. 
18 If the petitioner is required to prove his claim in his initial pleadings, then there is 
never a reason to hold an evidentiary hearing. That result would have serious due 
process implications, as doing away with evidentiary hearings altogether would likely 
deprive the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It would also run afoul of 
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Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. If Mr. Grant's uncontested allegations are properly 
accepted as true, then Mr. Grant has sufficiently proved his allegations so as to merit an 
evidentiary hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. 
Again, by not following this precedent, the district court erred in such a way as to 
undermine its decision. 
If Mata, Baldwin, and Charboneau II are properly applied in this case, it is clear 
that Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present several genuine issues of 
material fact in regard to some, if not all, of his claims. Those genuine issues of 
material fact requ an evidentiary hearing to sort out. See Franck-Teet v. State, 143 
C. The District Court Failed To Apply The Appropriate Standards Regarding The 
Prejudice Prong Of The Strickland Test When It SummaritLJ21smissed 
Mr. Grant's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
In wrapping up its discussion of the individual claims, the district court stated "the 
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no compelling argument 
that the outcome of his case would have been different but for his attorney's errors." 
(R., p.106.) This statement imputes the erroneous standard to all of Mr. Grant's claims. 
In addition, the district court's additional requirement of a "compelling argument" is also 
erroneous at the summary judgment proceedings, as Mr. Grant need only demonstrate 
that, if true, his factual allegations would support his claims. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 
153. The determination of whether the argument is compelling (i.e., proven to a 
sufficiency of the evidence) is one appropriately left until after the evidentiary hearing, 
the statutory procedure governing post-conviction, which provides for a hearing when 
the petitioner establishes a genuine issue of material fact. I.C. §§ 19-4906(b) & -4907. 
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after Mr. Grant has had the full opportunity to make a compelling argument based on all 
evidence, for which he needed the assistance of counsel. See Charboneau II, 144 
Idaho at 903. As such, this is yet another clear demonstration of the district court's 
erroneous actions in this case: the district court misinterpreted the prejudice prong of 
Strickland in its analysis of Mr. Grant's allegations. 
To demonstrate prejudice, the applicant need only demonstrate that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 
(emphasis added). the district court required Mr. Grant that 
outcome "would been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors."19 
e.g., R., pp.47; see also R., pp.95, 96, 106.) The district court's requirement that 
Mr. Grant demonstrate that the outcome would have been different placed a far more 
onerous burden on him than the one actually levied by the law: Strickland only requires 
the applicant to demonstrate the possibility that the outcome might change, whereas, 
under the district court's standard, Mr. Grant would have to prove the outcome would 
actually have changed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, to meet that burden, 
Mr. Grant needed only to undermine confidence in the outcome (i.e., make it less 
19 To this same end, the district court was requiring Mr. Grant to prove his allegations by 
a preponderance of the evidence. (See, e.g., R., pp.37, 39) That burden is premature 
since demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result establishes the 
genuine issue of material fact justifying a hearing. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. It is 
at that subsequent evidentiary hearing that he is required to prove his claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 121 Idaho 257, 258 
(Ct. App. 1992) ("In a post-conviction relief hearing, the petitioner has the burden of 
proving the allegations which entitle him to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." 
(emphasis added)). 
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certain as the result), not affirmatively an alternative outcome would have come to 
Strickland, U.S. at 694. 
If Baldwin and Strickland are properly applied in this case, it is clear that 
Mr. Grant's verified pleadings and affidavits present sufficient allegations of prejudice in 
regard to if not all, of his claims. As such, the failure to comply with those 
standards demonstrates the need to vacate the summary dismissal order and remand 
the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
D. 
As discussed in Section Ill, supra, Mr. alleged facts demonstrating 
possibility of several valid claims. In regard to some of them, his verified pleadings also 
alleged sufficient facts that demonstrate genuine issues of material fact, which should 
have entitled him to an evidentiary hearing on those issues. However, on others, the 
record does not contain sufficient facts to make that assertion, usually because the 
prejudice caused by trial counsel's errors, while implied, was not actually articulated.20 
However, they should remain viable issues on remand, since presumably, given the 
assistance of counsel, Mr. Grant could file an amended petition articulating that 
prejudice and presenting genuine issues of material fact in regard to those claims. 
20 Issues in this situation include, but are not limited to, Mr. Grant's claim that his 
attorney was ineffective for not reviewing the PSI with him or assisting him to object to 
erroneous or unreliable information therein (see Section 111(0), supra), Mr. Grant's claim 
that his attorney was ineffective for not presenting certain, articulated, mitigating 
evidence (see Section III(E), supra), and Mr. Grant's claim that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue or recusal of the district court judge 
(see Section III(F), supra). 
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However, as there are some issues in which Mr. Grant did allege, at least, 
genuine of material district court's decision to summarily dismiss the 
petition was erroneous and should be reversed. 
1. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To 
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him Of 
His Right To Remain Silent During The Presentence Investigations, Per 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Estrada 
As explained in Section III(C), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified 
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient, failing 
to inform him of his right to remain silent during the psychological examinations. 
(R., pp.3, 6, ) r. Grant also that information obtained during this interview 
was used against him at his sentencing hearing. (R., p.54.) As such, those verified 
facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's 
favor, would entitle him to relief for the ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561. Therefore, summary denial on that claim 
was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See 
Charboneau II, 144 Idaho at 903. 
2. Mr. Grant Alleged Facts That, If Accepted As True, Would Entitle Him To 
Relief Because His Attorney Was Ineffective By Inducing Him To Plead 
Guilty Based On False Assurances Regarding His Potential Sentence 
As explained in Section III(G), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified 
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that his attorney provided deficient representation by 
inducing him to plead guilty based on false assurances as to the potential overall length 
of his sentence and his initial participation in the rider program. (R., p.57.) As such, this 
robbed his guilty plea of the necessary voluntariness. See Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 884. 
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He also alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this deficient 
performance, as he in his verified response to the notice of intent to dismiss 
that there was "a strong likelihood" that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial. 
(R., p.58.) Since Mr. Grant need only undermine confidence in the outcome (in this 
case, the decision to plead guilty) to show prejudice, that verified allegation is sufficient 
to meet the requirement from Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As such, 
those verified facts and reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in 
Mr. Grant's favor, present a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, summary denial 
on that claim was inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
Relief Because His Guilty Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And 
Voluntarily Entered 
As explained in Section III(H), supra, Mr. Grant alleged facts in his verified 
pleadings sufficient to demonstrate that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
enter his guilty plea based on the fact that he was suffering a severe depressive 
episode associated with his mental health conditions. As such, those verified facts and 
reasonable inferences, presumed true and liberally construed in Mr. Grant's favor, 
would entitle him to relief. See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 678. Therefore, they present a 
genuine issue of material fact, and thus, summary dismissal on that claim was 
inappropriate and it should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Grant respectfully requests that this Court its review authority in this 
case. On review, he respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying him 
the assistance of counsel, vacate the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction 
petition, and remand this case for further proceedings. Additionally, because the district 
court erroneously summarily dismissed at least some of his claims, he respectfully 
requests this Court instruct that an evidentiary hearing be among the future 
proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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